Archive for the 'Trading' Category

30
Oct
11

Finanzas 101: FAQ, Short Selling + CDS

En el sitio de la Unión Europea, hay un accesible FAQ sobre la regulación sobre Short Selling y Credit Default Swaps.

¿Sesgos + momentum?, maybe.

Personalmente me quedo con la tabla comparativa -cerca del final- entre la regulacion del Short Selling en USA, EU y Hong Kong.

 

22
Oct
11

Grafico du Jour: Tenencia china de deuda US

(Fuente: Global Macro Monitor, via Creditwritedowns.com)

18
Oct
11

Paper: Anomalías y su impacto en el riesgo sistémico

The race to zero

1.  Introduction

Stock prices can go down as well as up.  Never in financial history has this adage been more apt than on 6 May 2010.  Then, the so-called “Flash Crash” sent shocks waves through global equity markets.  The Dow Jones experienced its largest ever intraday point fall, losing $1 trillion of market value in the space of half an hour.  History is full of such fat-tailed falls in stocks.  Was this just another to add to the list, perhaps compressed into a smaller time window?

No.  This one was different.  For a time, equity prices of some of the world’s biggest companies were in freefall.  They appeared to be in a race to zero.  Peak to trough, Accenture shares fell by over 99%, from $40 to $0.01.  At precisely the same time, shares in Sotheby’s rose three thousand-fold, from $34 to $99,999.99.  These tails were not just fatter and faster.  They wagged up as well as down.

The Flash Crash left market participants, regulators and academics agog.  More than one year on, they remain agog.  There has been no shortage of potential explanations.  These are as varied as they are many:  from fat fingers to fat tails; from block trades to blocked lines; from high-speed traders to low-level abuse.  From this mixed bag, only one clear explanation emerges:  that there is no clear explanation.  To a first approximation, we remain unsure quite what caused the Flash Crash or whether it could recur.

That conclusion sits uneasily on the shoulders.  Asset markets rely on accurate pricing of risk.  And financial regulation relies on an accurate reading of markets.  Whether trading assets or regulating exchanges, ignorance is rarely bliss.  It is this uncertainty, rather than the Flash Crash itself, which makes this an issue of potential systemic importance.

 In many respects, this uncertainty should come as no surprise.  Driven by a potent cocktail of technology and regulation, trading in financial markets has evolved dramatically during the course of this century.  Platforms for trading equities have proliferated and fragmented.  And the speed limit for trading has gone through the roof.  Technologists now believe the sky is the limit.

This rapidly-changing topology of trading raises some big questions for risk management.  There are good reasons, theoretically and empirically, to believe that while this evolution in trading may have brought benefits such as a reduction in transaction costs, it may also have increased abnormalities in the distribution of risk and return in the financial system.  Such abnormalities hallmarked the Flash Crash.  This paper considers some of the evidence on these abnormalities and their impact on systemic risk.

Regulation has thin-sliced trading.  And technology has thin-sliced time.  Among traders, as among stocks on 6 May, there is a race to zero.  Yet it is unclear that this race will have a winner.  If it raises systemic risk, it is possible capital markets could be the loser.  To avoid that, a redesign of mechanisms for securing capital  market stability may be needed.

Link al Paper

17
Oct
11

Tabla du Jour: Sin palabras…

(Fuente: Bespoke Investment Group)

15
Oct
11

Humor du Jour: End Market Correlation!

 (Fuente: Infectious Greed)

11
Oct
11

Finanzas 101: Proxy Hedging

Tal vez es una serie de post más para finanzas 301, pero los ultimos 3 post de Quantivity hacen un buen capitulo de Hedging.

Proxy / Cross Hedging

“The root challenge of two current equity risk and alpha projects boil down to hedging using non-underlying instruments, known as proxy hedging or cross hedging.”

Empirical Quantiles and Proxy Selection

“(…)how to choose an appropriate hedge instrument, especially amongst several alternatives.”

Empirical Copulas and Hedge Basis Risk

“Of particular interest is understanding the dynamics of basis risk under extreme scenarios (both up and down), which are driven by time-varying stochastic joint covariation.”

11
Oct
11

Paper: Una vuelta por el mundo…

Equity Premia Around the World

Abstract: 
We update our global evidence on the long-term realized equity risk premium, relative to both bills and bonds, in 19 different countries. Our study now runs from 1900 to the start of 2011. While there is considerable variation across countries, the realized equity risk premium was substantial everywhere. For our 19-country World index, over the entire 111 years, geometric mean real returns were an annualized 5.5%; the equity premium relative to Treasury bills was an annualized 4.5%; and the equity premium relative to long-term government bonds was an annualized 3.8%. The expected equity premium is lower, around 3% to 3½% on an annualized basis.

Link al Paper

04
Oct
11

Tabla du Jour: Cinco meses en rojo

(Fuente: Big Picture)

03
Oct
11

Paper: Equity Yields

Equity Yields

Abstract
We study a new data set of prices of traded dividends with maturities up to 10 years across three world regions: the US, Europe, and Japan. We use these asset prices to construct equity yields, analogous to bond yields. We decompose these yields to obtain a term structure of expected dividend growth rates and a term structure of risk premia, which allows us to decompose the equity risk premium by maturity. We find that both expected dividend growth rates and risk premia exhibit substantial variation over time, particularly for short maturities. In addition to predicting dividend growth, equity yields help predict other measures of economic growth such as consumption growth. We relate the dynamics of growth expectations to recent events such as the financial crisis and the earthquake in Japan.

Link al Paper

03
Oct
11

Paper: Información privilegiada

Decoding Inside Information

Abstract

Exploiting the fact that insiders trade for a variety of reasons, we show that there is  predictable, identifiable “routine” insider trading that is not informative for the future  of firms. A portfolio strategy that focuses solely on the remaining “opportunistic”  traders yields value-weighted abnormal returns of 82 basis points per month, while  abnormal returns associated with routine traders are essentially zero. The most informed opportunistic traders are local, non-executive insiders from geographically concentrated, poorly governed firms. Opportunistic traders are significantly more likely to have SEC enforcement action taken against them, and reduce trading following waves of SEC insider trading enforcement.

Link al Paper



																



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