Posts Tagged ‘Default



13
May
11

Gráfico du Jour: Grecia, Reestructuración de Deuda

(Fuente: Barclays, via FT Alphaville)

01
May
11

Datos, Documentación y Conocimiento

Parece ser lo que proponen -en distinta prosa- Shiller y de Soto para prevenir futuras debacles económicas. O por lo menos, suavizarlas.

Posturas como estas alimentan el debate sobre la economía de la información.

Vale rescatar frases como tales:

“TODAY, our prosperity depends on finance, and on its associated disciplines of accounting and macroeconomics.” (Shiller)

“If we can agree that the recession wasn’t about bubbles but about the organization of knowledge, we can move on to restoring the systems that allowed the global economy to expand more in the last 60 years than in the previous 2,000” (de Soto)

22
Apr
11

Gráfico du Jour: Exposición a Grecia y compañia

(Fuente: Forex Blog)

Recuerdos

Humor

26
Feb
11

¿Completando mercados o timba timba?

Si no me equivoco este producto -CEBO (titulo que se presta al juegos de palabras)- ya estaba, solo que ahora lo relanzan especificando “el evento” como bancarrota. Por su parte, Zero Hedgese preocupa” por el efecto en los modelos actuales.

25
Feb
11

Paper: Tasas de recuperación

Calibration of Structural and Reduced-Form Recovery Models

Abstract

In recent years research on credit risk modelling has mainly focused on default probabilities. Recovery rates are usually modelled independently, quite often they are even assumed constant. Then, however, the structural connection between recovery rates and default probabilities is lost and the tails of the loss distribution can be underestimated considerably. The problem of underestimating tail losses becomes even more severe, when calibration issues are taken into account. To demonstrate this we choose a Merton-type structural model as our reference system. Diffusion and jump-diffusion are considered as underlying processes. We run Monte Carlo simulations of this model and calibrate different recovery models to the simulation data. For simplicity, we take the default probabilities directly from the simulation data. We compare a reduced-form model for recoveries with a constant recovery approach. In addition, we consider a functional dependence between recovery rates and default probabilities. This dependence can be derived analytically for the diffusion case. We find that the constant recovery approach drastically and systematically underestimates the tail of the loss distribution. The reduced-form recovery model shows better results, when all simulation data is used for calibration. However, if we restrict the simulation data used for calibration, the results for the reduced-form model deteriorate. We find the most reliable and stable results, when we make use of the functional dependence between recovery rates and default probabilities.

Link al Paper

 

17
Dec
10

Paper: Hipotecas (x3)

Strategic Default on First and Second Lien Mortgages  During the Financial Crisis

Abstract

Strategic default behavior suggests that the default process is not only a matter of inability to pay.   Economic costs and benefits affect the incidence and timing of defaults.  As with prior research, we find that people default strategically as their home value falls below the mortgage value (exercise the put option to default on their first mortgage).   While some of these homeowners default on both first mortgages and second lien home equity lines, a large portion of the delinquent borrowers have kept their second lien current during the recent financial crisis.  These second liens, which are current but stand behind a seriously delinquent first mortgage, are subject to a high risk of default.   On the other hand, relatively few borrowers default on their second liens while remaining current on their first.  This paper explores the strategic factors that may affect borrower decisions to default on first vs. second lien mortgages.  We find that borrowers are more likely to remain current on their second lien if it is a home equity line of credit (HELOC) as compared to a closed-end home equity loan.  Moreover, the size of the unused line of credit is an important factor.  Interestingly, we find evidence that the various mortgage loss mitigation programs also play a role in providing incentives for homeowners to default on their first mortgages.

Link al Paper

 

Location Efficiency and Mortgage Default

Abstract

Using a sample of over 40,000 mortgages in Chicago, Jacksonville, andSan Francisco, we model the probability of mortgage default based on differences in location efficiency. We used two proxy variables for location efficiency: 1) vehicles per household scaled by income and 2)Walk Score. We find that default probability increases with the number of vehicles owned after controlling for income. Further, we find that default probability decreases with higher Walk Scores in high income areas but increases with higher Walk Scores in low income areas. These results suggest that some degree of greater mortgage underwriting flexibility could be provided to assist households with the purchase of location efficient homes, without increasing mortgage default. They also support the notion that government policies around land use, zoning,infrastructure, and transportation could have significant impacts on mortgage default rates.

Link al Paper

 

Mortgage Choices and Housing Speculation

Abstract

We describe a rational expectations model in which speculative bubbles in house prices can emerge. Within this model both speculators and their lenders use interest-only mortgages (IOs) rather than traditional mortgages when there is a bubble. Absent a bubble, there is no tendency for IOs to be used. These insights are used to assess the extent to which house prices in US cities were driven by speculative bubbles over the period 2000-2008. We find that IOs were used sparingly in cities where elastic housing supply precludes speculation from arising. In cities with inelastic supply, where speculation is possible, there was heavy use of IOs, but only in cities that had boom-bust cycles. Peak IO usage predicts rapid appreciations that cannot be explained by standard correlates and this variable is more robustly correlated with rapid appreciations than other mortgage characteristics, including sub-prime, securitization and leverage.Where IOs were popular, their use does not appear to have been a response to houses becoming more expensive. Indeed, their use anticipated future appreciation. Finally,consistent with the reason why lenders prefer IOs, these mortgages are more likely to berepaid earlier or foreclose. Combined with our model, this evidence suggests that speculative bubbles were an important factor driving prices in cities with boom-bust cycles.

Link al Paper

 

26
Nov
10

Gráfico du Jour: PIIGS, ¿misma dinámica? ¿no sera mucho?

FT Alphaville publicó este gráfico con el fin de mostrar un plausible futuro escenario para PIIGSlandia y su rescate. Siempre Argentina como ejemplo.

(Fuente: Morgan Sanley, via FT Alphaville)

Intercambiando mails internos, mientras algunos actualizaban su set de información otros comentaban esto:

 

¿Lo que muestra que Europa no tiene remedio? A mi lo que me dice es que a no ser que seas intermediario, no te metas con bonos europeo periféricos en esta dinámica, en la que las pérdidas son revisadas al alza luego de cada ronda, con un mercado reacio a seguir financiando (lo que es causa de los paquetes de rescate).

Diferencias: En 2000-2001 había acreedores potenciales para Argentina, pero no querían prestar (digo, había recesión, pero era un pequeño episodio en la mega burbuja que seguimos gestando, y los fundamentals de argie lovsi country cambiaron radicalmente un año después, solo había que bancarla pero, who knows)

Ahora Alemania puede pero no quiere, el resto del mundo no puede, China podría si quisiera.

Si además FMI y UE se ponen de acuerdo en que los tenedores deben aceptar parte de la pérdida (hoy son los acreedores de bancos irlandeses, pero mañana puede ser cualquiera), cada paquete va a servir para que los tenedores actuales salgan. Talk about moral hazard, da que pensar, ¿no? ¿Es mejor una regla buena o una regla mala? Lo que es mejor es ser cauto me parece, para evitar llegar a situaciones de esquina, donde vos estás en el rincón y el turro mercado del otro lado, con una espada en la mano.

Si la UE no traza una línea y se decide a salvarse a si misma come hell or high water, diría que el riesgo de “contagio”, “defaults en masse” o como quieras es muy factible.

Hazardously moral, Trader de Bonos




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